


DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Information Handling Committee
WASHINGTON, DC 20505

14 NOV 1988
ICS 7886-88



MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CMCDS Concept of Operations Working Group
Chairmen, CMCDS User Services Working Group
Chairpersons, CMCDS Architecture and Communications
Working Group

25X1 FROM:


Chairman, CMCDS Security Working Group

SUBJECT:

Comments on 3 November 1988 CMCDS CONOPS and Request
for Clarification of CONOPS and User Requirements

REFERENCE:

ICS 7880-88, dtd 3 Nov 88, subj: Community Multilateral
Counterterrorist Data System (CMCDS) Concept of Operations

1. The Community Multilateral Counterterrorist Data System (CMCDS) security working group (SWG) met on 8 November 1988 to develop further the security requirements for CMCDS based on previous security issues that had surfaced with the use of DESIST and the referenced CONOPS. The security working group is using issue papers as a mechanism to highlight alternatives, define possible areas of disagreement, and achieve consensus on the minimum acceptable security requirements which are summarized in a draft CMCDS security policy. 

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4. The SWG has agreed that the national subsystem will be accessible by advanced workstations that provide appropriate security for compartmented mode operations and the group has endorsed the use of one or more of the five workstations being developed by commercial vendors under the joint DIA, NSA NCSC, and IC Staff effort which will be available before the CY1992 initial date of operations anticipated for CMCDS. The SWG has specified that the compartmented mode workstation (CMW) to be used for CMCDS access must provide full audit of all CMCDS data printed locally and that this audit data must be periodically forwarded to the CMCDS host for central monitoring. In addition, the CMW to be used for CMCDS must provide encryption for protection of CMCDS data on removable storage media. []

5. The SWG has examined the concern over accounting for all printed output and the past requirement to have only "host connected" printers. The group has agreed that printing from the CMCDS compartmented mode workstation will be acceptable as long as full audit capability is provided by the workstation and that audit data is forwarded periodically to the host for centralized monitoring. []

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15. Alternatively, operational data or special compartmented information other than TS/SI/TK can be retained on different hosts and "bridge" access to these separate hosts can be provided via a CMCDs compartmented mode workstation. The CMW is designed to provide such a capability while providing for electronic isolation of data sent to or received from different hosts. The CMWs will be certified by NSA and DIA at the B1 or B2 level.

16. Please let us know what additional security questions need to be addressed. Request your comments before the next SWG meeting which is scheduled for the morning of 22 November 1988.

Distribution:

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